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Book Reviews 
SHOCKING THE CONSCIENCE: 
PRAGMATISM, MORAL REASONING, AND 
THE JUDICIARY 
THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL 
THEORY. By Richard A. Posner. 1 Harvard University 
Press. 1999. Pp. 310. $29.95. 
Daniel A. Farbei 
"The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one 
great thing." So holds a proverb made famous by Isaiah Berlin. 
Richard Posner began his career as a hedgehog, his "one great 
thing" being economic efficiency. But Judge Posner has now be-
come one of most fox-like of modern thinkers, with books on 
topics as diverse as literature, sexuality, aging, and jurispru-
dence. In each field he has shown sufficient mastery to call into 
question his own assertion that "there is a limit to how brilliant 
you can be and want to go to law school." (p. 293) 
In Problematics, Judge Posner takes up the question of the 
role of moral reasoning in judging.3 He concludes that its role is 
somewhere between slim and nil. Consequently, moral philoso-
phers have almost nothing to say of relevance to judges (and lit-
tle enough for anyone else). (pp. 3, 310) In particular, moral 
I. Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and 
senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School. 
2. Henry J. fletcher Professor and Associate Dean for Faculty and Research, 
University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks to Don Dripps, David McGowan, Mike 
Paulsen, and Suzanna Sherry for helpful comments. 
3. Important portions of the book, along with responses from distinguished com-
mentators and a reply from Judge Posner, appear at 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1637, 1637-1823 
(1998). I also benefitted from a number of the contributions to Morris Dickstein, ed., 
The Revival of Pragmatism· New Essays on Social Thought, Law, Culture (Duke U. 
Press, 1998). 
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theory has nothing to teach judges about even "such morally 
charged subjects as abortion, affirmative action, racial and sexual 
discrimination, and homosexual rights." (p. x) 
Posner calls on constitutional scholars to abandon "what 
passes as theory in jurisprudential circles" and devote their at-
tention to the "real world" aspects of constitutional law. (p. x.) 
But this does not mean that he views judging, in constitutional 
cases or elsewhere, as value free. Instead, he says, where prece-
dent and other legal texts run out, judges "can do no better than 
to rely on notions of policy, common sense, personal and profes-
sional values, and intuition and opinion, including informed or 
crystallized public opinion." (p. viii) Endorsing a position he at-
tributes to Holmes, he maintains that "while the political process 
is ordinarily the right way to go," sometimes "an issue on which 
public opinion is divided so excites the judge's moral emotions 
that he simply cannot stomach the political resolution that has 
been challenged on constitutional grounds." (p. 142) 
One alternative to Posner's approach is formalism, which 
seeks to make judging value-free. Having dealt with this ap-
proach elsewhere, Posner does not give it much attention in this 
book. Nor will I in this review.4 Yet another alternative is to 
provide some more systematic account of morality that would 
assist judges. I will focus on Posner's rejection of this alterna-
tive and on his explanation of his own preferred approach. 
Like his other work, Problematics is a dazzling display of 
Posner's stylistic powers and intellectual range. It stumbles, in 
my admittedly non-expert opinion, in attempting too hasty a 
treatment of some philosophical issues, though its skepticism 
about the legal relevance of high-level moral theory seems well-
justified. It also overstates the roles of policymaking and of 
emotional outrage in constitutional cases. In that respect, how-
ever, it is a useful counter to the current obsession with textual 
and historical fidelity at the expense of real world utility. Fi-
nally-my most serious criticism-Posner seems drawn by his 
desire to be hard-headed into occasional insensitivity toward 
certain moral values. Posner's work as a judge shows that he 
himself is not insensitive to these values, but they seem oddly 
shortchanged in his theoretical account. 
4. I also will not deal with certain aspects or this book. such as his call to make the 
third year o[ law school optional. (pp. 287-89) 
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I. WHAT CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SHOULD NOT 
INVOLVE: MORAL ARGUMENT 
677 
Posner is skeptical of the utility of moral reasoning for two 
reasons: because as a moral relativist, he doubts that any signifi-
cant moral truth exists, and because in any event moral argu-
ment is too inconclusive to lead anywhere, particularly in legal 
disputes. 
At the outset, it is important to be clear about just what 
Posner is criticizing-and more importantly, what he is not. He 
makes it clear that he does not reject the existence of moral val-
ues; (p. 50 n.78) moral skeptics and moral relativists "have the 
same moral emotions as everyone else and differ only in not 
thinking that moral disagreements can be bridged by moral rea-
soning." (p. 142) Nor, despite his rejection of "moral reason-
ing," does he reject all forms of reasoning about morality, 
though he does reject what he calls academic moralism. Specifi-
cally, he does not believe that moral decisionmaking is purely a 
matter of unreasoned personal convictions that can never be 
subject to useful discussion. Although his positive remarks 
about moral discussion are scattered throughout the book, taken 
together they actually leave a significant role for deliberation 
about moral or ethical issues. (He defines morality to include 
only "duties to others" as opposed to ethical reflections on how 
best to live. (p. 4)) As he sees it, moral agreement may be pos-
sible on specifics even among people who disagree about broad 
principles. 5 (p. 153 n.133) Moral philosophy can also enrich our 
perspectives by articulating moral systems and thereby giving 
people choices about how to live or helping them to discover or 
articulate their own implicit commitments. (pp. 31-32) Finally, 
Posner believes, moral judgments can sometimes be educated by 
immersion in facts. (p. viii) Morality is in large part emotional, 
but "emotion is not pure glandular secretion"; it is "influenced 
by experience, information, and imagination, and can thus be 
disciplined by fact." (p. 260) So he leaves room for reasoned 
discussion of morally charged problems. 
5. Posner recognizes some scope for constructive discussion about morality. 
There is room, he says, for argument about whether moral codes arc adaptive in term's 
of society's goals (though the goals themselves may be culture specific). (p. 6) Although 
they cannot resolve moral disagreement, moral philosophers may provide other useful 
services. Moral theory may also dispel errors when legal analysts take philosophical posi· 
tions. Posner also concedes that "philosophy, in the form not of moral theory but of 
careful analysis of difficult concepts, can be helpful in clarifying certain legal issues, such 
as intent, responsibility, and ... causation." (p. 120) 
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What, then, does he mean when he says he rejects the use of 
moral reasoning or moral argument in law and more generally? 
What he seems to mean is that fundamental moral issues are 
simply not open to useful discussion. One of my colleagues 
thinks the fetus is a person and abortion is murder; another 
thinks that the fetus is not a person and abortion laws oppress 
women. Posner believes that there is no "right answer" to this 
problem (at least, not one definable in secular terms6). Even if 
in some sense a right answer did exist, he contends, no convinc-
ing way would exist for us (in particular, for judges) to identify it. 
Posner is a moral relativist of sorts, arguing that "morality is 
local, ... there are no interesting moral universals." (p. 6) Ad-
mittedly, some rudimentary principles (such as don't kill your 
friends indiscriminately) may be universal to all human societies. 
But meaningful moral principles are local. (p. 6) "[T]he moral-
ity that condemns the traitor, adulterer, etc., cannot itself be 
evaluated in moral terms. That would be possible only if there 
were precise, and hence operational, transcultural moral truths." 
(p. 9) Morality is relative not only between but even within so-
cieties. A person who murders an infant is immoral within our 
society. Posner says he would consider the person who advo-
cates baby killing "lunatic, a monster, or a fool," but would 
"hesitate to call him immoral, just as I would hesitate to call Je-
sus Christ immoral for having violated settled norms of Judaism 
and Roman law or Pontius Pilate immoral for enforcing that 
law."7 (p. 10) Similarly, it is "vacuous" to complain that the 
subjects of female genital mutilation have no effective choice, 
because the "moral code of these societies is not founded on 
principles of freedom, autonomy, or equality, and there is no 
6. Posner's treatment of religion seems inconsistent. At times, he seems to limit 
his scope to secular arguments; at others, he criticizes the inability of philosophers to re-
but religious positions. On the one hand, he says his concern is with "the type of moral-
izing that is or at least pretends to be free of controversial metaphysical commitments, 
such as those of a believing Christian, and so might conceivably appeal to the judges of 
our secular couns." (p. 15) On the other hand, as evidence of the futility of moral argu-
ment. he stresses the impossibility of the secular moralist convincing various kinds of re-
ligious believers. (p. 55) But the secularist may never have a convincing argument 
against religion's "controversial metaphysical claims." He may be no more able to con-
vince the religious fundamentalist that the earth is billions of years old than that homo-
sexuality is morally acceptable. Yet, Posner clearly thinks the age of the eanh is a matter 
of objective fact, not opinion. 
7. Posner's view is exemplified by his discussion of suttee, the "immolation-
nominally, at least, voluntary-of the widow on her husband's bier," as practiced in 
nineteenth century India. (p. 10) As a British colonial administrator, he says, he would 
have banned the practice, because he would have found it "disgusting, not because I 
found it immoral." (pp. 10-11) 
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privileged standpoint from which to argue that it should be." (p. 
22) True, people could call moral codes they dislike immoral, 
but "this is- name-calling, rather than appealing to a common set 
of premises from which persuasive arguments could be derived 
by logical or empirical means." (p. 23) In short, he tends toward 
what he calls "a kind of existential morality ... in which people 
take responsibility for their actions without the comfort of sup-
posing that they are acting in accordance with universal moral 
norms[.]"8 (p. 29) (This kind of existentialism sounds good in 
theory, but the fact that Hannibal Lecter could claim to be fol-
lowing it gives me pause.) 
Posner's version of moral relativism is hard to assess, partly 
because of his unsystematic presentation, but mostly because it is 
not clear how he intends it to be taken. On one reading, he is 
making a strong philosophical claim: it is just a fact that morality, 
which consists of the moral judgments people make about their 
own behavior, is subjective rather than objective. But if this is 
what he means, his admittedly evocative remarks are too far 
from presenting a fully developed philosophical argument to 
make criticism fruitful. 9 (As is often the case in philosophical ar-
gument, simply trying to pin down the meaning of critical terms 
is often extraordinarily difficult-a philosopher can play more 
tricks with the word "objectivity" than a tax lawyer can play with 
"income.") In any event, this reading would leave us with the 
puzzle of why someone who is so avowedly skeptical about sub-
stantive moral reasoning would have such extraordinary confi-
dence in other types of philosophical arguments that command 
no greater degree of consensus. 
Another, perhaps more plausible reading is also available. 
Although he does sometimes seem to be arguing in favor of the 
truth of a philosophical position, at other times, Posner seems 
merely to be presenting a viewpoint on morality, not in the ex-
pectation that it could be proved true, but in the hope that it will 
be found attractive. He sometimes seems to view philosophical 
8. Having adopted this stance, would one not be drawn to consider other people as 
the kinds of beings who arc also capable of this existential nobility? It may be wrong to 
treat such beings as merely a means to increasing total social utility. Morcvcr, we might 
give special protection to activities that develop the capacity to make such existential 
choices, and limit the government's power to interfere with the most fundamental 
choices, those that do the most to define the self. There seems to be lurking here the 
possibility of the kind of concept of human dignity that Posner seems determined to re-
sist. 
9. For a critique of Posner's earlier discussion of these topics, see Eric Rakowski, 
Posner's Pragmatism, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1681 (1991). 
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positions themselves as being in a sense subjective. 10 On this 
reading, the question is not whether Posner's own views of mo-
rality are "true" (whatever that adjective means as applied to a 
philosophical theory), but whether they offer an attractive way 
of life, or perhaps, whether they offer a compelling if unprovable 
account of the meaning of morality. If this is what Posner in-
tends, however, I am yet to be convinced. Part III discusses why 
I find his moral theory unsatisfyingly thin. More generally, I find 
his moral skepticism empty for the reason that Dworkin gives for 
dismissing most philosophical skepticism: "The only kind of 
skepticism that counts, anyway, is the really disturbing kind, the 
chilling internal skepticism that grips us in a dark night, when we 
suddenly cannot help thinking that human lives signify nothing, 
that nothing we do can matter when we and our whole world will 
in any case perish in a cosmic instant or two." 11 But this kind of 
skepticism seems wholly alien to Posner's thought: his skepticism 
simply doesn't run this deep. 
What sends Posner down the path toward moral relativism? 
His background in economics may be part of the explanation. 
Economists are used to viewing personal preferences as arbi-
trary-simply one of the givens in an equation. Merely because 
this is convenient for building economic models does not neces-
sarily mean an economist should adopt it in other contexts, but 
there may be an impulse in that direction. More importantly, I 
think, Posner is repelled by the rhetoric of those espousing uni-
versal moral philosophies. This rhetoric is too often character-
ized by a complacency about privileged access to moral truth, a 
lack of interest in how the world looks from other viewpoints, 
and a willingness to rest on comfortable abstraction rather than 
grappling with social realities or tragic choices-in short, by a 
fuzzy haze obscuring tough decisions. It would not be hard to 
find examples in the work of academic philosophers where ser-
monizing takes the place of hard thinking about policy issues. It 
is quite another thing, however, to show that these flaws are in-
curable. 
Posner's moral relativism may offer support to his skepti-
cism about the potential role for moral reasoning in judicial deci-
10. For instance, he speaks of the useful function that moral philosophers might 
play in self-discovery, so that a person might discover from reading phil?sophy that he 
has actually been a utilitarian all along; Posner also speaks of the aesthetic grounds that 
Nietzche may have had for adopting his own views of morality. 
II. Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It, 25 Phil. and 
Pub. Aff. f57, 129 (1996). 
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sions, but the two seem largely independent. Even if he is right 
that the full range of moral disagreement in our society is too 
broad to allow meaningful discussion, judges are concerned with 
a much smaller spectrum of opinion. For instance, some people 
may want their society to destroy itself rather than enduring, 
which Posner calls the Masada complex. (p. 46) This complex is 
undoubtedly rare among judges and their most significant audi-
ences. In our society, at least, judges and key portions of the 
public can be assumed to value liberal democracy, economic 
prosperity, and the rule of law. Given this degree of initial con-
sensus, meaningful moral argument may well be possible. In an 
earlier book, speaking of a dispute about an aesthetic matter, 
Posner said he would prefer to take one side than the other, be-
cause it was the side with the better arguments. These argu-
ments, he added, "may not be valid sub specie aeternitatis-may 
be no more than arguable. But within the cultural community 
from which the debaters are likely to be drawn, they are stronger 
arguments than the contrary arguments. "12 Within the American 
legal community, the same may be true of many moral dis-
agreements arising in litigated cases. 
But of course, we know as a simple fact that some moral 
disagreements cannot be so resolved. In our society, reasonable 
people may well agree about the moral importance of the choice 
whether or not to have a child-virtually no one would think 
that the government can properly compel a woman to have an 
abortion without at least some extraordinarily powerful justifica-
tion. We all know, however, that agreement runs out when the 
question is whether to ban abortion instead. In principle, per-
haps moral reasoning could produce consensus on issues such as 
abortion rights; in practice, we know it won't. Judges will have 
to look elsewhere to decide cases of this kind. 
Posner is right, I believe, that there is little practical urgency 
to questions about whether our moral and political views have 
some deep coherence, or about whether they are merely our 
opinions or lay some claim to objective truth. Yet, though logi-
cally convincing answers to these questions seem unavailable, it 
seems to be impossible to silence the urge to think about them.13 
12. Richard A. Posner, Cardozo: A Study in Reputation 64 (U. of Chicago Press, 
1990). But perhaps Posner's skeptical impulses have hardened in the meantime. Indeed, 
they may have hardened even since 1995, when he spoke of the "continuity of legal and 
moral discourse." Richard Posner, Overcoming Law252 (Harvard U. Press, 1995). 
13. Pragmatism can be used (or perhaps abused) as an excuse to dismiss such ques-
tions, but I think this is a mistake. Pragmatism clearly means that our practices do not 
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(If humans have a language instinct, as some linguists suggest, 
perhaps we also have a philosophy instinct, that makes us ask 
possibly unanswerable questions about the meaning of life.) 
It is a tribute to the compelling nature of these philosophi-
cal problems that Posner cannot help himself from addressing 
them, even while protesting that the whole venture is misguided. 
His difficulties in addressing them are also a tribute to their in-
tellectual intractability. If we wait for a solution to these philo-
sophical problems before getting on with our lives, we will be 
waiting a long time. Unlike Posner, I believe that philosophers 
like Rawls are engaged in a worthy quest, and that something 
important would be lost in our culture if we ceased to struggle to 
understand the nature of justice. But I think Posner is right that 
moral philosophy is unlikely to have any direct payoff in an-
swering the hard questions faced by courts. 
It is at least faintly ridiculous to suppose that what the ad-
ministration of justice most needs is for judges to read Kant on 
their lunch breaks. The reason is not just that their professional 
training leaves them unprepared for this task, or even that Kant 
might be wrong. It is also that most philosophy is too far re-
moved from the concrete issues that confront judges, and trying 
to address those issues in terms of philosophical theory would 
only be a distraction.14 
II. WHAT CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SHOULD INVOLVE: 
POSNERIAN PRAGMATISM 
In rejecting the argument that judges should be moral phi-
losophers, one argument that Posner does not make is that this 
role would be illegitimate. Because judicial review has been 
seen as an anomaly, 15 much debate has taken place about when 
it is legitimate for judges to strike down statutes.16 On the whole, 
need foundational justifications to establish their legitimacy. But it docs not mean (or at 
least I believe it should not mean) that we must abandon any effort at deepening our un· 
derstanding of the human condition-although it might suggest that this enterprise, too, 
will succeed best with the usc of practical reason rather than deductive logic. If the point 
of pragmatism is to make sense of our lived experiences, it should include among those 
experiences our drive to grapple with the fundamental perplexities of life. 
14. It is difficult to say anything useful in the abstract about how to solve hard cases 
(otherwise, they wouldn't be hard). I have tried to illustrate the process, however, in 
Daniel Farber, £co-Pragmatism: Making Sensible Environmental Decisions in an Uncer· 
cain World (U. of Chicago Press, 1999). 
15. I am not sure that it should be, since nearly all democracies these days have ju-
dicial review in some form or another, Britain being in this respect an outlier. 
16. For an excellent overview of constitutional theory and thoughts about criteria 
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Posner considers the issue of legitimacy to be a red herring: "if 
law meets 'the functional requirements of a complex society' by 
providing a reasonably predictable, adaptable, and just frame-
work for peaceful social interactions, where 'just' means nothing 
more pretentious than consistent with durable public opinion, 
who is going to raise an issue of legitimacy about the framework, 
that is, about the law itself?" (p. 106) Rather, Posner views le-
gitimacy as a matter of convention-a judicial decision is ille-
gitimate if it "rested on arguments that the legal culture ruled 
out of bounds for judges." (p. 106) As we will see, he sees a 
definite role for the judge's personal values in decisionmaking. 
Posner has some noteworthy general remarks about the 
craft of judging. "It is immensely useful," he says, to "strip away 
the conventional verbiage in which the issues come wrapped" 
and instead consider "the actual interests at stake, the purposes 
of the participants, the policies behind the precedents, and the 
consequences of alternative decisions." (pp. 208-09) But the 
"social interest in certainty of legal obligation requires the judge 
to stick pretty close to statutory text and judicial precedent in 
most cases and thus to behave, much of the time anyway, as a 
formalist." (p. 209) He adds that a part of every decision should 
be conventional legal reasoning, defined as "reasoning with ref-
erence to distinctive legal materials and arguments that can be 
brought to bear on the case and to the law's traditional preoccu-
pations, for example with stability and the right to be heard and 
the other 'rule of law' virtues." (p. 262) Moreover, in areas of 
the law where the use of clear rules is appropriate, borderline 
cases can sometimes be resolved only through somewhat arbi-
trary formalistic means. 17 (p. 124) 
Still, though conventional legal reasoning is part of the 
judge's role, for Posner it is only one part. He views courts, "at 
their best," as "councils of wise elders meditating on real dis-
putes," adding that "it is not completely insane to entrust them 
with responsibility for resolving these disputes in a way that will 
produce the best results in the circumstances rather than resolv-
ing them purely on the basis of rules created by other organs of 
for theory selection, see Richard H. Fallon, How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 
Cal. L. Rev. 535 (1999). 
17. In practice, Posner's positions on the bench, at least in statutory cases, differ 
little from those of his formalist colleague Frank Easterbrook. Sec Daniel A. Farber, Do 
Theories of Statutory Interpretation Matter? A Case Study {forthcoming, Northwestern 
University Law Review, 2000). This may confirm Posner's view of the irrelevance of 
theory. 
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government or by their own previous decisions." (pp. 257-58) 
The consequence, he cheerfully concedes, is that courts will treat 
the· Constitution and to a lesser extent statutes "as a kind of 
putty that can be used to fill embarrassing holes in the legal and 
political framework of society." (p. 258) All this is the worst 
form of heresy to formalists. 
Normative considerations play several roles in this process. 
First, in applying a rule or filling a gap, the judge may take into 
account consensus moral values. "Morality is a pervasive feature 
of social life and is in the background of many legal principles." 
(p. 137) Everyone agrees that criminals should not profit from 
their crimes; hence, the wills statute should not be interpreted to 
allow a killer to inherit from his victim. (p. 140) 
Second, the judge may consider the social consequences of 
his decision. For instance, in the VMI case/8 Posner argues, the 
Court should not have interfered with the all-male military 
academy. In his view, "the Court had no basis either theoretical 
or empirical for thinking that the admission of women would not 
impair VMI's educational program disproportionately to the 
slight harm to women of being excluded from the school," taking 
into account the small number of women involved, the modest 
harm to them individually, (p. 171) and the unlikelihood that the 
case would serve as a precedent for excluding women from other 
institutions. (p. 169) Considering how little we know about 
education theory, judges should "tolerate continued experimen-
tation and diversity in public education."19 (p. 173) Posner ap-
plauds the transformation of antitrust law into a form of applied 
economics as "a success story of which all branches of the law 
and allied disciplines can be proud." (p. 229) But at least in 
constitutional law, Posner is wary of this kind of social engi-
neering without a firm empirical backing: judges· should consider 
"their ignorance of the consequences of a challenged govern-
mental policy that is not completely outrageous a compelling 
reason for staying the judicial hand in the absence of sure guid-
ance from constitutional text, history, or precedent." (p. 182) 
Third, in some cases, the judge's conscience simply will not 
allow him to stomach the action of another branch of govern-
ment. If judges are carefully chosen from diverse portions of so-
18. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
19. For a critique of his discussion of VMI, see Deborah Jones Merritt, Constitu-
tional Fact and Theory: A Response to Chief Judge Posner, 'l7 Mich. L. Rev. 1287. 1288-
91 (1999). 
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ciety, this action-which verges, he admits, on civil disobedi-
ence-sends an important message to the populist branches of 
government.20 (p. 143) He is unconcerned about the fact that 
this is a partially emotional decision, remarking that anger 
"founded on a responsible appreciation of a situation need not 
be thought a disreputable motive for action, even for a judge; it 
is indeed the absence of any emotion in such a situation that 
would be discreditable." (p. 260) Although deferential to the 
other branches of government, the pragmatic judge "does not 
throw up his hands and say 'sorry, no law to apply' when con-
fronted with outrageous conduct that the framers of the Consti-
tution neglected to foresee and make specific provision for." (p. 
258) For example, a pragmatist judge wouldn't stomach a life 
sentence without parole for a sixteen-year-old who sold a single 
marijuana cigarette. (p. 258) The wise pragmatic judge, how-
ever, does not rely only on his own personal opinions, but checks 
them against those of some broader community, whether local or 
worldwide. (p. 259) Posner calls this the "outrage" school of 
constitutional thought, a school he identifies with Thayer, Car-
dozo, Frankfurter, and Harlan. (p. 147) (A moral philosopher 
might think something more systematic than educated outrage is 
called for, but we saw in Part I that Posner thinks nothing more 
systematic is available.) 
None of these positions is shockingly novel, and there is 
much to be said in their favor. There are also familiar arguments 
against each of these positions (from formalists, in particular), 
and I will not canvass those objections here.21 What makes Pos-
ner's statement of these views seem, if not shocking, at least bru-
tally candid is his willingness on occasion to cut loose from con-
ventional legal reasoning. Apropos of the marijuana cigarette 
case, for example, he says that if he found relevant evidence of 
original intent, he would "think it a valuable bone to toss to a 
positivist or formalist colleague," but he himself would put no 
weight on this evidence, not feeling himself "duty-bound to 
maintain consistency with past decisions." (p. 259) 
If there is a common thread in recent constitutional 
thought, it is a stress on fidelity: fidelity to the framers, fidelity to 
the constitutional text, or fidelity to tradition. And along with 
20. It is unclear whether other government official (or private citizens) would, hy 
the same reasoning, also be entitled to engage in similar forms of civil disobedience. 
21. For a critique of Posner's constitutional theory, sec Jeffrey Rosen, Overcoming 
Posner, 105 Yale L. J. 581,583-96 (1995). 
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this emphasis on fidelity is a distrust of any true creativity on the 
part of judges. Posner will have none of this. Not that he would 
ignore the past: "[i]n many cases the best the judge can do for 
the present and the future is to insist that breaks with the past be 
duly considered." (p. 261) But even these cases, the pragmatic 
judge "lacks reverence for the past, a felt duty of continuity with 
the past." (p. 261) Such a sense of duty would be "inconsistent 
with the forward-looking stance and hence with pragmatism." 
(p. 261) Because of this forward-looking stance, Posner is in a 
sense closer jurisprudentially to a Brennan than to a Harlan 
(though his substantive positions are obviously closer to 
Harlan's) 
In this respect, Posner is a refreshing counterweight to the 
current obsession with judicial constraint and fidelity to author-
ity. But I think he goes too far in rejecting respect for the past 
(including original intent) as an independent factor in decision. 
Constitutional law is largely a matter of governance, but it is also 
an important part of our national identity and culture. The Court 
needs to provide a convincing interpretation of our constitu-
tional history, telling a believable story about how it is carrying 
forward the project of American constitutionalism begun by the 
Framers. Thus, as with individuals, continuity with the past is 
not simply a prejudice; it is a way of maintaining and redefining 
national identity.22 Maintaining some connection with the 
American past is therefore an important part of the Court's insti-
tutional role. Posner might respond, however, that judges need 
no reminder of the need to respect the past, whereas the current 
jurisprudential climate discourages them from attending to the 
needs of the present and the future. Similarly, while I think that 
moral outrage can be more mediated by reason than Posner 
does, his willingness to admit to an emotional dimension of 
judging is a welcome relief from the dry impersonality of so 
much of the current Court's opinions and so much legal theory. 
III. THE MORAL PROBLEMA TICS OF POSNERIAN 
THEORY 
Much of what Posner says about constitutional law is re-
lated to his moral views in only a negative way. His rejection of 
moral theory eliminates any constraint that a theory of legiti-
22. Sec W. James Booth, Communities of Memory: On Identity, Memory, and Debt, 
93 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 249 (1999). 
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mate political authority (as opposed to prudence) might place on 
judicial policymaking. What fills this space, however, has no 
necessary connection with his moral relativism. In this sense, the 
moral and constitutional portions of the book are largely inde-
pendent of each other. But both discussions do strike similar 
and sometimes jarring chords. In particular, Posner's discussion 
sometimes seems oddly oblivious to notions of human dignity 
and to the related inherent value of the rule of law. The result 
sometimes resembles some form of moral tone-deafness. 
We might begin with his remarks about the Nazis. Posner 
adopts a deliberately clinical tone on this subject, perhaps in a 
desire to avoid what he considers conventional sentimentality. 
He tells us, for example, that "[o]ne reason for the widespread 
condemnation of the Nazi and Cambodian exterminations is that 
we can see in retrospect that they were not adaptive to any plau-
sible or widely accepted need or goal of the societies in ques-
tion." (p. 21) Similarly, he describes Nazism as "a failed ex-
periment in social organization by limited, violent, and 
dangerous people who didn't share our values" -adding that, 
since this description seems "inadequate to our anger," he has 
no objection to "the employment of moral terminology to de-
note degrees of indignation." (p. 89) So might speak the Vulcan 
Commander Spock on the starship Enterprise. The human 
members of the crew would properly respond, I think, that the 
precisely appropriate description of the Nazis is that they were 
evil. It is not a word that seems to be part of the vocabulary of 
Posner's moral theory, or rather, I suspect, it is one that he feels 
a need to avoid. 
Similarly, in discussing Holmes's views of criminal law and 
eugenics, Posner writes that "the maintenance of a moral veneer 
in the law's dealing with the people subject to it, especially anti-
social people subject to it, offers a first line of defense against 
excesses of official violence. It is not healthy to treat even dis-
gusting criminals as animals .... " (p. 209) But Holmes is ex-
cused from understanding this principle because "it is a lesson of 
totalitarianism, which did not yet exist in 1897"-this lesson be-
ing that "[e]xcluding a class of human beings from the human 
community can become a habit and spread from criminals to 
ne'er-do-wells to the sick and the aged and the mentally dis-
turbed or deficient . . . and finally to noncomformists and to 
members of unpopular minorities." (p. 209) Posner concludes 
by asking, "[d]o I have to explain, perhaps by reference to moral 
philosophy, why these would be bad results in the conditions of 
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our society?" (p. 209) We seem to be left to infer that, apart 
from this slippery slope of which Holmes was unaware, he would 
have been reasonable to exclude some of the people listed above 
from the human community-and that maybe excluding all of 
them from humanity would be O.K. except for the peculiar 
"conditions of our society." Something has gone seriously wrong 
when theoretical commitments lead a humane and decent person 
to make remarks of this tenor. Somehow, the idea that certain 
actions are an affront to human dignity seems to have slipped 
out of his grasp. 
Something is also off-key about Posner's discussion of due 
process. He suggests that perhaps "the rule of law should not 
extend all the way to the margins of society." (p. 198) This is a 
reference to an earlier discussion of criminal procedure. That 
discussion takes off from the assertion that the propertied men 
who adopted the Bill of Rights fought for the procedural protec-
tions "a society needs in order to make property and political 
rights secure against abuse by government"; in contrast, the 
rights created by the Warren Court were those "that criminals, 
and members of an underclass or lumpenproletariat most likely 
to be mistaken for criminals by overzealous police or prosecu-
tors, want or need." (p. 161) "For the most part," he adds, "en-
forcement of these rights undermines property rights and per-
sonal security by making the punishment of criminals less swift 
and certain."23 (p. 161) For this reason, Posner questions 
whether counsel should be provided to the indigent, and at least 
thinks it is just as well that the general quality of indigent coun-
sel is poor. (pp. 161-64) 
True, Posner has some concern about convicting the inno-
cent, but only because doing so reduces the disincentive to 
commit crimes. (The disincentive to commit a crime is diluted 
since you might be punished anyway even if you don't commit 
the crime.) (p. 163) But a little thought shows that this is actu-
ally a minor issue, which shouldn't give Posner much pause, at 
least if there are substantially more innocent people in the 
population than guilty ones. For example, we could convict 
more innocent people than guilty ones, and still leave deterrence 
relatively untouched, though we would admittedly be wasting 
23. The assumption is plainly that being mugged and being falsely arrested should 
be regarded as in some sense equivalent harms, from the point of view of those designing 
legal rules. The view that the law is as responsible for harms it fails to prevent as for 
those it imposes seems questionable. 
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some penological resources.24 (In fact, there is an irony lurking 
here: deterrence is most undermined by the conviction of the in-
nocent when the guilty are a relatively high part of the relevant 
sub-population.25 On this theory, since crime is more prevalent" 
among the poor, we should probably provide better lawyers to 
them than to the rich.) As to why other constitutional protec-
tions such as freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures 
have no value as to the indigent, Posner is silent. 
In his capacity as a judge, Posner undoubtedly gives the 
rights of the indigent the same weight as those of the wealthy. 
Having read a number of his judicial opinions, I am confident 
that he would be just as disturbed by the wrongful conviction of 
an indigent person as of an investment banker, and that he 
would be as affronted by an unjustified strip search of one as the 
other.26 But his theory seems to leave him no way to express the 
notion that the Constitution protects the rights and dignity of all 
alike. 
Again, we need to ask why Posner chooses this path. Why 
is he so anxious to repress references to human dignity or basic 
rights, when in practice he is seemingly sensitive to these values? 
Part of his reaction to contemporary moral philosophy and its 
vocabulary, as I've discussed earlier, seems to be aesthetic, but 
24. An illustration may help demonstrate why deterrence is little affected by con· 
victing the innocent. Suppose that of 100,000 people, 95% are innocent and 5% arc 
guilty. Suppose also that in a given year 10,000 people arc convicted, of whom only a 
quarter are truly guilty. Under the hypothetical, the odds of being punished if you arc 
innocent arc only about 8% (7 ,500 out of 95,000), while the odds of being punished if you 
are guilty arc 50% (2,500 out of 5,000). So even in this extreme case in which most of 
those punished are innocent, the effect on deterrence is not substantial, because the 
guilty still face much higher risks of conviction. 
25. As shown in the previous footnote, the effect on deterrence is small when the 
rate of criminality in a population is low. In contrast, it is significant when guilt is wide· 
spread, because unless an even higher percentage of the convicted arc actually guilty, the 
innocent have no incentive to refrain from crime. Consider, in contrast with the previous 
footnote, an example in which the rate is very high. Suppose that in some subpopulation, 
three-quarters of every 100,000 people are criminals, and that a quarter of the 10,000 
convictions annually involve innocent defendants (so the percentage of innocents among 
the convicted is much smaller than in the previous example). Then the odds of being 
punished if you are guilty are 10% (7,500 out of 75,000), while the odds of being pun-
ished if you arc innocent are also 10% (2,500 out of 25,000). Hence, the criminal justice 
system has no deterrent effect at all. The lesson is that the higher the percentage of the 
guilty in a subpopulation, the more important it is to avoid convicting the innocent, so as 
to avoid undermining deterrence. 
26. Sec, e.g. Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 152-55 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that cross-gender monitoring of nude 
prisoners is unconstitutional); United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1331-34 (7th Cir. 
1990) (Posner, J., dissenting), affd, Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991) (pro-
testing unwarrantedly harsh sentence for LSD seller). 
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no less significant for that reason. His concern about the rheto-
ric of legal theory is also intensely practical. Posner is afraid that 
instead of confronting the plight of real people, we will immerse 
ourselves in abstractions; rather than looking out at the world, 
we will stare into our navels. This is a genuine risk, and one that 
is realized all too often in constitutional scholarship. This hyper-
trophied moral conceptualism is an intellectual tumor that Pos-
ner would like to remove. But as with certain tumors, it is 
doubtful that we can excise every trace of these moral concep-
tions from the legal mind without fatally impairing vital func-
tions. 
